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Abstract 
Recently, deep learning, which uses Deep Neural Networks (DNN), plays an 
important role in many fields. A secure neural network model with a secure 
training/inference scheme is indispensable to many applications. To accomplish such a 
task usually needs one of the entities (the customer or the service provider) to provide 
private information (customer’s data or the model) to the other. Without a secure 
scheme and the mutual trust between the service providers and their customers, it will 
be an impossible mission. In this paper, we propose a novel privacy-preserving deep 
learning model and a secure training/inference scheme to protect the input, the output, 
and the model in the application of the neural network. We utilize the innate properties 
of a deep neural network to design a secure mechanism without using any complicated 
cryptography component. The security analysis shows our proposed scheme is secure 
and the experimental results also demonstrate that our method is very efficient and 
suitable for real applications. 
 
Keywords: Deep learning, deep neural networks, privacy preserving, model protection, 
security. 
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1 Introduction 
Today, deep learning technologies have been widely applied to many segments of 
applications. These application designers are usually focused on “how to train a useful 
model” but largely ignore the security issue. This security concern has greatly affected 
the practicality of the applications. We use the following examples to illustrate the 
importance of the privacy issue that plays an important role in Artificial Intelligence 
(AI) applications. 
Recently, many EDA companies have applied various AI techniques to their CAD 
tools for improving the IC-design productivity [5]. For instance, the automatic 
placement and routing (APR) is an important physical design technology in the back-
end flow of the electronic design automation (EDA) design. In the APR, it first performs 
the floorplanning and placement followed by the routing procedure. The routing 
procedure first performs a global routing to estimate the overall routing area based on 
the placement result, and then performs a detailed routing procedure to complete the 
routing. The correlations between the global route and the detailed route are critical 
when conducting the “routability analysis” (number of wires in a grid) in the 
floorplanning and placement stages. If they are not well correlated, it may cause 
excessive iterations of the global/detailed routing and/or placement/routing procedures 
that will result in unbearable run times. Hence, some EDA companies intend to use 
machine learning techniques for better correlation predictions so that their IC-design 
customers can use this information to achieve an efficient design process. In order to 
accomplish this mission, the EDA companies need to build up a model (by training) 
between the global and detailed routing, which is depended upon a database of 
extensive floorplan/placement information owned by the IC-design customers. 
However, to the IC-design customers, the floorplan/placement data contains 
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confidential information regarding to their IC products. On the other hand, the EDA 
companies also will not reveal their models for security reason. Building an effective 
model requires massive human-labeled data, powerful computing hardware, meticulous 
parameters setting, and researchers’ efforts. Without the mutual trust between EDA 
companies and IC-design customers, it will be an impossible mission for the current 
available methods. 
The similar dilemmas also occur in some medical applications. Diabetic 
retinopathy is one of the important causes of blindness. Early diabetic retinopathy 
usually has no special symptoms, causing people with diabetes often only pay attention 
to the control of blood sugar while ignoring other physical conditions. If the symptom 
is detected early and provided with proper treatment, most patients can avoid surgery 
and maintain vision in a better condition. Recently, ophthalmologists try to use machine 
learning for better detection of diabetic retinopathy. They use a huge amount of 
retinopathy images for training a medical model that can precisely label the problematic 
area from a patient’s retina image. Unfortunately, the diabetic information is usually 
owned by the endocrinology department, not the ophthalmology department. Although 
the ophthalmologist may have the technology to detect diabetic retinopathy, the medical 
record (patient’s retina image and the analysis result) does not allow to exchange 
between both departments under some privacy law’s protection, such as Patients’ Bill 
of Rights and Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act. 
To resolve the above dilemmas has motivated us to investigate the security issue 
and develop a privacy-preserving deep learning model. In this paper, we use the innate 
properties of a deep neural network to design a secure mechanism without using the 
fully homomorphic encryption, the garbled circuit, or the watermark. Our proposed 
scheme can protect the privacy of the input, the output, and the model in the application 
of the neural network, and support the transformation from a non-secure model into a 
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secure model. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the related 
work. In Section 3, we give the problem definition. In Section 4, we review the deep 
learning neural networks. Our proposed scheme is presented in Section 5. After that, an 
extension idea is presented in Section 6. Our security analysis and experimental results 
are given in Section 7 and Section 8, respectively. Finally, we conclude the paper in 
Section 9. 
 
2 Related work 
In the past, many protecting strategies have been proposed to solve the 
cooperation’s dilemma in the data inference phase, which can be divided into three 
categories: the homomorphic encryption-based [2-4, 9, 12, 13], the garbled circuit-
based [14], and the watermark-based [16, 18]. 
The homomorphic encryption (or fully homomorphic encryption [6]) allows the 
computational operation on an encrypted state, and the decrypted result still matches 
the same computational operation on the plaintext. If the scheme that supports 
“arbitrary” computational operation on the ciphertext, it is called the fully 
homomorphic encryption. In 2006, Barni [2] proposed an interactive protocol to protect 
the privacy for the data owner using homomorphic encryption. In the first layer of the 
neural networks, the data owner encrypts her/his input data and sends it to the model 
provider. Then, the server executes by multiplying the encrypted data with the weights 
of the first layer and sends back to the data owner. After that, the data owner decrypts, 
applies the activation function, and encrypts the result again and then sends it to the 
server for the computational operation of the next layer. The above procedures will be 
repeated layer by layer till the last layer of the neural networks. However, in 2007 and 
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2008, Orlandi et al. [12] and Piva et al. [13] both pointed out that the weights of neural 
networks in [2] can be obtained by the data owner. Dowlin et al. [4] proposed the 
CryptoNets in 2016. The scheme is based on homomorphic encryption but no need for 
data owner to interact with the server in each layer of the neural networks. In 2017, 
Chabanne et al. [3] proposed an improved scheme that extended the neural layer of 
CryptoNet while keeping accuracy at a high level. Further, Liu et al.’s [9] used the 
homomorphic encryption and the secret sharing technology to design MiniONN that 
does not need to change the structure of neural network during the training phase. The 
fully homomorphic encryption based schemes can protect both input’ and output’s 
privacies as well as the model privacy because it is built-in on the provider side. 
However, the homomorphic encryption (or fully HE) is a complexity system [10] and 
it has some limitations on a practical application [1]. 
The garbled circuit [17] is a cryptographic protocol that allows two parties jointly 
compute a function 𝑓(𝑥, 𝑦) with their secret inputs 𝑥 and 𝑦, where the function 𝑓 
should be represented as a Boolean circuit with 2-input gates, such as AND, OR, XOR 
gates. Both the garbled circuit and the homomorphic encryption are trying to compute 
on an encrypted (or garbled) state; hence, the core idea is identical but using different 
technologies. In 2017, Rouhani et al. [14] designed DeepSecure by using the garbled 
circuit. In their scheme, the operational structure of the neural network has to convert 
into a Boolean circuit first. Then, the data owner makes the circuit garbled using her or 
his garbled keys and sends the garbled tables and one of the garbled keys (that 
corresponding to the data owner’s input bit) to the model provider. After receiving the 
tables and a key, the model provider and the data owner engage in a 1-out-of-2 oblivious 
transfer (OT) protocol [11] to get another garbled key (that corresponding to the model 
provider’s input bit) from the data owner. Then, the model provider can evaluate the 
received tables, compute the corresponding encrypted data inference, and send the 
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result back to the data owner. Finally, the data owner can obtain the result by the rest of 
the garbled keys. Similar to the fully homomorphic encryption schemes, the garbled 
circuit based schemes can protect both input’ and output’s privacies. However, the 
garbled circuit is a Boolean circuit, which means that the complexity of the bitwise 
operation depends on the structure of the neural network. Moreover, it needs to handle 
a huge mount encryption keys and symmetric encryption/decryption operations, since 
handling one-bit operation requires 6 keys, 8 encryptions, 8 decryptions, and support 
by an extra one OT protocol. 
Unlike the homomorphic encryption and the garbled circuit, the watermark 
technology does not focus on protecting the privacy of input/output data but the model 
itself. A trusted third party (such as the Court) can extract the watermark from the model, 
and then confirms the ownership by a verification mechanism. In 2017, Uchida et al. 
[16] first proposed a framework to embed watermarks in the DNN. Subsequently, 
Zhang et al. [18] proposed an improved scheme that does not require a model provider 
to access all the parameters of a stolen model when extracting the watermarks in [16]. 
The watermark schemes do not protect the input and output’s privacies, and only protect 
model passively i.e., only after the model has been stolen. 
 
3 Problem definition 
The privacy issues will occur in the inference phase as well as the training phase. 
For example, in the inference phase, the customers need to protect their input data and 
output results without revealing their data to outside world. In addition, we need a 
dataset to train a model, but the data may come from different customers under their 
protection. Unless the customers abdicate their privacy right, it is hard to collect enough 
data for training without any privacy protection mechanism. Hence, we can formally 
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define the target DL environment and the three security requirements as: 
Our environment has two entities, i.e., a customer (also called data owner in this 
paper) and a service provider (also called the model provider in this paper). Here, we 
assume that the service provider already has a trained model and the customer will use 
this model to inference their data. Therefore, the privacy requirements in this 
environment can be defined as below. 
 
Input’s privacy: The service needs the customers to send their data to the service 
provider for data inference. The input data may be personal, confidential or sensitive in 
nature. If in the inference phase, it requires to protect the confidentiality of the 
customers’ input data. We say that it is an input privacy protection. 
 
Output’s privacy: After the data inference, the model will give a predicted result of the 
corresponding input data. If the results are required to keep confidential, we say that it 
is an output privacy protection. 
 
Model’s privacy: A completed model consists of the neural network’s topology 
(structure) and the parameters (values of the weight and the bias) on every neuron. If 
the model is required to keep confidential, we say that it is a model privacy protection. 
 
4 Deep neural networks 
Neurons are the basic elements in a deep neural network. Each neuron is connected 
to a number of neurons around it, thereby to construct the complex “layer” structure. 
Normally, when the neurons in the same layer are fully connected to the neurons in the 
next layer, we called it “fully connected (FC) layer”. The input nodes provide 
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information from the outside world to the network and are together referred to as the 
“Input Layer”. The collection of hidden nodes forms a “Hidden Layer”, which perform 
computations and transfer information from the input nodes to the output nodes. Then, 
the output nodes are collectively referred to as the “Output Layer” and are responsible 
for computations and transferring information from the network to the outside world. 
In order to handle the signals from the previous layer, a neuron normally performs 
two kinds of computation: 1) the linear and 2) the nonlinear computations. According 
to different input wires, a neuron has assigned different weights and biases on each of 
it. These weights and biases are constantly updated in the training phase but stabilized 
when the training is completed. Then, the weights, the biases, and the input signals are 
calculated together by a linear computation such as Equation (1). 
𝑦 = 𝑤 ∙ 𝑥 + 𝑏 (1) 
, where 𝑥 is the input vector, 𝑤 is the weight matrix, 𝑏 is the bias vector, and 𝑦 is 
the output vector. 
After the linear computation, the neuron performs the nonlinear transformation 
(also called activation function) to model nonlinear behaviors between the input data 
and the output result. There are various activation functions which are categorized and 
summarized in [9]. Here, we only introduce the ReLU function and the Sigmoid 
function which are two common activation functions using in the deep neural networks. 
As shown in Equation (2), the ReLU function can easily eliminate the value that is less 
than 0 and the Sigmoid function can keep the output value between the range of 0 to 1. 
ReLU: 𝑓(𝑦) = {
0, 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑦 < 0
𝑦, 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑦 ≥ 0
 
Sigmoid: 𝑓(𝑦) =
1
1+𝑒−𝑦
 
(2) 
After finishing both the linear and the nonlinear computations, the handled signal is 
sent to the next neural layer as a new input. Then, it repeats the above procedures layer 
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by layer till the last (output) layer. Finally, we can obtain a predicted result 𝑦′. If 𝑦′ is 
obtained in the inference phase, this result is the final predicted result; otherwise, we 
then start to perform the backpropagation algorithm [15] by using 𝑦′ and the correct 
answer 𝑦. The backpropagation algorithm is an optimization algorithm for the cost (or 
called the error) in DNN. The concept of backpropagation is to find the cost at the last 
layer, which between the correct answer and the predicted result. Then, the algorithm 
propagates the cost from the back to the front layer to compute the cost for every neuron. 
Finally, we can minimize the costs by the gradient descent algorithm and optimizes the 
parameters in DNN. Figure 1 illustrates the architecture of the deep neural networks 
and an individual neuron. 
 
Remarks. We state the proposed scheme is the DNN-based but not convolution neural 
network (CNN)-based. The reason is that we believe the DNN is the fundamental of the 
“layer” structure in DL. Due to our proposed scheme can be performed in the “layer” 
structure, it can be applied to the CNN model easily. 
 
Fig. 1. The DNN architecture and a neuron.  
5 The proposed scheme 
In this section, we propose a novel privacy-preserving scheme which allows two 
10 
 
entities (the data owner and the model provider) to securely cooperate by using our 
secure DNN model. Our scheme is divided into two steps: 1) the complement and 2) 
the partitioning. The first step fuzzes the output by a complement signal to achieve the 
effect of encryption. More precisely, we target on the true-false classification (2-
classification) learning and try to teach the DNN model to flip its output by a supervised 
learning method. In the second step, the model provider partitions the model into two 
independent parts, and then share one part of the model with the data owner. 
Consequently, the data owner will not obtain the complete model and hence the model 
provider can protect the model. Furthermore, the data owners can run the model on their 
sides without revealing the data and thus protect their precious data. We will discuss 
our proposed scheme in details as follows. 
 
5.1 The complement 
(Output’s protection) Because of the model provider owns the whole parameters in 
the model and usually responsible for the core procedure of the model performing, she 
or he can easily access to the output data directly. To protect the output’s privacy, we 
defined the first concept of the proposed scheme as follows: 
𝑑𝑜𝑢𝑡 ⊕ 𝑐𝑠 = 𝐹[1,𝑀](𝑑𝑖𝑛||𝑐𝑠) (3) 
, where 𝐹[1,𝑀](∙)  is our secure model (with 𝑀  layer), 𝑑𝑖𝑛  is the input data, || 
denotes the concatenate operation, 𝑐𝑠 ∈𝑅 {0, 1}  is a complement signal, 𝑑𝑜𝑢𝑡 ∈
{𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑒, 𝑓𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑒} = {1, 0} is the predicted (output) result, and ⊕ denotes the exclusive 
OR operation. By observing the Equation (3), the model complements or not its output 
based on the complement signal 𝑐𝑠  chosen by the data owner. Since the model 
provider does not know this 𝑐𝑠, we say that the output is secure by fuzzing. 
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5.2 The partitioning 
(Input’s and model’s protection) Normally, the inference procedure needs interaction 
between the data owner and the model provider. That is, one of them is relatively 
disadvantage because she or he needs to provide “something” (whether data or model) 
to continue the interaction with the other one. To protect both the input data and the 
model at the same time, we defined the second concept of the proposed scheme as 
follows: 
𝐹[1,𝑘]
𝑐 (∙)||𝐹[𝑘+1,𝑀]
𝑠 (∙)
𝑘
← 𝐹[1,𝑀](∙) 
𝑑𝑜𝑢𝑡
𝑐 = 𝐹[1,𝑘]
𝑐 (𝑑𝑖𝑛||𝑐𝑠) 
𝑑𝑜𝑢𝑡 ⊕ 𝑐𝑠 = 𝐹[𝑘+1,𝑀]
𝑠 (𝑑𝑜𝑢𝑡
𝑐 ) 
(4) 
, where ← denotes the partition operation, 𝑘 is the partitioning layer of the model 
𝐹[1,𝑀](∙), 𝐹[1,𝑘]
𝑐 (∙) is a client-side model that includes the layers from 1 to 𝑘 of the 
secure model 𝐹[1,𝑀](∙) , 𝐹[𝑘+1,𝑀]
𝑠 (∙) is a server-side model that includes the rest of 
layers (from 𝑘 + 1 to the layer 𝑀), and 𝑑𝑜𝑢𝑡
𝑐  is the output result from the client-side 
model. The partitioning in Equation (4) means, by given a secure model 𝐹[1,𝑀](∙) and 
a number 𝑘, the model provider can divide 𝐹[1,𝑀](∙) into two subset models: a client-
side model 𝐹[1,𝑘]
𝑐 (∙) and a server-side model 𝐹[𝑘+1,𝑀]
𝑠 (∙). 
After that, the model provider publishes 𝐹[1,𝑘]
𝑐 (∙) but keeps 𝐹[𝑘+1,𝑀]
𝑠 (∙) secret. 
Hence, the data owner can input the private data into 𝐹[1,𝑘]
𝑐 (∙) to obtain 𝑑𝑜𝑢𝑡
𝑐 . Once 
the data owner sends 𝑑𝑜𝑢𝑡
𝑐  to the model provider, the model provider can continue the 
inferencing procedure. Figure 2 shows the details of the partitioning phase, where the 
model provider first partitions her/his model 𝐹[1,5](∙)  into 𝐹[1,2]
𝑐 (∙)  and 𝐹[3,5]
𝑠 (∙) . 
Then, the input data 𝑑𝑖𝑛  (ex. a cat image as an input), the complement signal 
𝑐𝑠 ∈𝑅 {0, 1} (ex. 1 as an input; 1 also denotes flip the output), and the client model 
𝐹[1,2]
𝑐 (∙) (e.g., the first two layers) are computed by the data owner. After receiving 
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𝑑𝑜𝑢𝑡
𝑐  (the output of 𝐹[1,2]
𝑐 (∙)) from the data owner, the model provider then sends 𝑑𝑜𝑢𝑡
𝑐  
to 𝐹[3,5]
𝑠 (∙) for the rest of the computations. Then, the model provider can obtain a 
predicted result 𝑑𝑜𝑢𝑡 ⊕ 𝑐𝑠 (e.g., dog as an output answer). Finally, the model provider 
sends 𝑑𝑜𝑢𝑡 ⊕ 𝑐𝑠 back to the data owner. When the data owner receives the predicted 
result from the model provider, she or he can complement the predicted result to obtain 
the real answer 𝑑𝑜𝑢𝑡 (cat as the real answer) according to the chosen signal 𝑐𝑠. 
 
 
Fig. 2. The partitioning phase of the proposed scheme. 
 
Remarks. The data owner only obtains one part of the model. Meanwhile, the model 
provider cannot extract 𝑑𝑖𝑛 and 𝑐𝑠 from 𝑑𝑜𝑢𝑡
𝑐  (the proof will be shown in Section 
7). Therefore, we say that both the input data and the model are secure by the partitioned 
model. 
 
5.3 The secure model 
After explaining the two concepts of the proposed scheme, we then introduce how 
to train a secure model 𝐹[1,𝑀](∙) in this subsection. We first defined the concept of the 
training as follows: 
𝐿′ = 𝑁𝑒𝑤𝐿𝑎𝑏𝑒𝑙(𝐷) 
𝐹𝑠(∙) = 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛(𝐹𝑜𝑙𝑑(∙), 𝑘, 𝐿
′, 𝐷) 
(5) 
13 
 
, where 𝑁𝑒𝑤𝐿𝑎𝑏𝑒𝑙(∙) is a new labeling algorithm, 𝐷 is a dataset, 𝐿′ is a new label 
set, 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛(∙) is our training method, 𝐹𝑜𝑙𝑑(∙) is an old (non-secure) model, and 𝑘 
is the partitioned layer of the network in Section 5.2. By observing the Equation (5), 
the model provider has to perform a new labeling algorithm 𝑁𝑒𝑤𝐿𝑎𝑏𝑒𝑙(∙) to get the 
new label set 𝐿′. Then, she or he uses the dataset 𝐷 with 𝐿′ and 𝑘 to train a secure 
model 𝐹[1,𝑀](∙). Our training method accepts the model provider to reuse their non-
secure model 𝐹𝑜𝑙𝑑(∙) ; hence, the 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛(∙)  allows the model provider to input 
𝐹𝑜𝑙𝑑(∙) or nothing. 
Now, the model provider can obtain the 𝐿′  by the new labeling algorithm 
𝑁𝑒𝑤𝐿𝑎𝑏𝑒𝑙(∙). Let the dataset be 𝐷: = {𝑑𝑖|1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑚}. Then, each element 𝑑𝑖 of the 
dataset 𝐷 has labeled with the label 𝑙𝑖 ∈ {𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒, 𝑓𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑒} . Now, the model provider 
randomly generates the complement signal set 𝐶𝑆: = {𝑐𝑠𝑖|1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑚}, where 𝑐𝑠𝑖 ∈
{0, 1}. After that, the model provider inputs 𝐷, 𝐹, and the labels 𝑙𝑖 into the algorithm 
𝑁𝑒𝑤𝐿𝑎𝑏𝑒𝑙(∙). Finally, 𝑁𝑒𝑤𝐿𝑎𝑏𝑒𝑙(∙) outputs the new label set 𝐿′: = {𝑙𝑖′|1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑚}, 
where 𝑙𝑖′ ∈ {𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒, 𝑓𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑒} is the new label on the element 𝑑𝑖. The detail of our label 
algorithm is shown in Figure 3. 
 
 
Fig. 3. The labeling algorithm 
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After finishing the labeling, the model provider uses the dataset 𝐷 with the new 
label set 𝐿′ and 𝑘 to train her/his secure DNN model by the following steps: 
 
Step 1. If the model provider already has a non-secure (old) model 𝐹𝑜𝑙𝑑(∙) and 𝑘 ≠ 1, 
she or he directly jumps to Step 2; otherwise, the model provider (does not have 
any model) directly jumps to Step 6. 
Step 2. The model provider fixes all of the parameters (weights and biases) from layer 
1 to layer 𝑘 − 1 of the model 𝐹𝑜𝑙𝑑(∙). 
Step 3. Then, the model provider concatenates the complement signal 𝑐𝑠𝑖 with the 
output of the layer 𝑘 − 1 and the new concatenated input keeps the rest of 
computing from the layer 𝑘 to the last layer 𝑀. 
Step 4. After that, the model provider uses the output 𝑦′ with corresponding new label 
𝑙′ then performs the backpropagation algorithm (Section 4). 
Step 5. Repeat Step 3 until the training is finished. 
Step 6. The model provider concatenates the complement signal 𝑐𝑠𝑖 with the input 
data 𝑑𝑖 and computes from the layer 1 to the last layer. 
Step 7. Then, the model provider uses the output 𝑦′ with corresponding new label 𝑙′ 
then performs the backpropagation algorithm. 
Step 8. Repeat Step 6 until the training is finished. 
 
After that, the model provider can obtain the secure model 𝐹[1,𝑀](∙) . Figure 4 
shows that the difference between a normal (non-secure) DNN model and our proposed 
(secure) model. 
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Fig. 4. The difference between the non-secure model and our secure model. 
 
Remarks 1. The reason why we separate the model on 𝑘 is to ensure two input data 
(such as the 𝑑𝑖𝑛 and 𝑐𝑠 ) are already well mixed in layer 𝑘 . Otherwise, the model 
provider can easily separate two input data by the received result cause they are only 
concatenating operation (ex. 𝑑𝑖𝑛||𝑐𝑠) before layer 𝑘. 
 
Remarks 2. The number 𝑘 also decides the tradeoff between the accuracy and the 
training time of our secure model. When 𝑘 becomes bigger, the model provider can 
gain better accuracy and lower retraining time. But in meanwhile, it will leak more 
parameters of the model to the data owner. The model provider can determine the 
balance between security level and the performance by our experimental results in 
Section 8. 
 
6 Extension 
In this section, we want to introduce an extension idea for upgrading our scheme. 
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Although our secure scheme now only supports the true/false classification learning 
(the model’s output only true or false, 2-classification), we believe that the main idea 
in our proposed scheme can easily extend to multiple classification case (the model’s 
output 𝑛 -classification, where 𝑛 > 2 ). Here, we only briefly explain our extension 
idea. Similar to the idea that is to teach the model to complement its output by a secure 
signal, the extension idea becomes to teach the model to shift its output by a secure 
offset. 
We first define an index number on each different kind of output labels in a dataset 
𝐷: = {𝑑𝑖|1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑚} and each element 𝑑𝑖 of the dataset 𝐷 has labeled with the label 
𝐿: = {𝑙𝑖|1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑚} . Here, the range of 𝑙𝑖  is 1 ≤ 𝑙𝑖 ≤ 𝑛 , where 𝑛  as the total 
number of different kinds of output labels in 𝐷. Now, the model provider randomly 
generates the offset 𝑂: = {𝑜𝑖|1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑚}, where 1 ≤ 𝑜𝑖 ≤ 𝑛. Then, we inputs 𝐷, 𝑂, 
𝑙𝑖 , and 𝑇 into the algorithm 𝑁𝑒𝑤𝐿𝑎𝑏𝑒𝑙_2(∙) . Finally, 𝑁𝑒𝑤𝐿𝑎𝑏𝑒𝑙_2(∙) outputs the 
new label set 𝐿′: = {𝑐𝑖′|1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑚} , where 1 ≤ 𝑐𝑖′ ≤ 𝑛  is the new label on the 
element 𝑑𝑖. The detail of the labeling algorithm 𝑁𝑒𝑤𝐿𝑎𝑏𝑒𝑙_2(∙) is shown in Figure 
5. 
 
 
Fig. 5. Our new labeling algorithm for 𝑛-classification. 
 
After that, we train the model using eight steps in Subsection 5.3 and separate the 
model using the partitioning method in Subsection 5.2. Finally, the model should be 
able to recognize the offset and shift its output by it. Hence, our extension idea should 
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have the ability to protect the input data, the output result, and the model in the multiple-
classification learning model. 
 
7 Security analysis 
This section first presents the Cramer’s rule and our definition. Then, we 
substantiate our system is secure (input’s privacy) under the Cramer’s rule and give a 
suggestion for security consideration. After substantiating the privacy of the input, we 
then prove our secure model can protect both the output’s and the model’s privacies in 
the last two subsections. 
 
7.1 Cramer’s rule and our definitions 
Cramer’s rule, a theorem in linear algebra, is a formula for the solution of a system 
of linear equations with as many equations as unknowns. 
 
Theorem 1 (Cramer’s rule). A matrix of the form 𝑨𝒙 = 𝒃 has a unique solution 𝒙, if 
and only if the matrix of coefficients 𝑨 is non-singular, where 𝑨 is a 𝑛 × 𝑛 matrix, 
𝒙 = (𝑥1, 𝑥2, … , 𝑥𝑛)
𝑇  and 𝒃 = (𝑏1, 𝑏2, … , 𝑏𝑛)
𝑇 . The unique solution 𝒙  is given by 
𝑥𝑖 = 𝑑𝑒𝑡(𝑨 ←𝑖 𝒃) /𝑑𝑒𝑡 (𝑨) , where 𝑨 ←𝑖 𝒃  is the matrix obtained from 𝑨  by 
replacing the 𝑖-th column of 𝑨 by the column of constants 𝒃. 
 
According to Theorem 1, we can define the unsolvability in Definition 1. 
 
Definition 1 (Unsolvability) Let 𝒜 be a probabilistic polynomial time adversary, 𝒜 
cannot obtain the unique solution by solving the linear equations when the number of 
unknowns is greater than the number of equations. 
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Proof. First, the linear equations with 𝑛 unknowns and 𝑚 equations, which described 
as follows: 
𝑎11𝑥1 + 𝑎12𝑥2 + ⋯ + 𝑎1𝑛𝑥𝑛 = 𝑏1 
𝑎21𝑥1 + 𝑎22𝑥2 + ⋯ + 𝑎2𝑛𝑥𝑛 = 𝑏2 
⋮ 
𝑎𝑚1𝑥1 + 𝑎𝑚2𝑥2 + ⋯ + 𝑎𝑚𝑛𝑥𝑛 = 𝑏𝑚 
(6) 
is equivalent to a matrix equation of the form 𝐴′𝑥′ = 𝑏′, where 
𝐴′ = (
𝑎11 𝑎12 … 𝑎1𝑛
𝑎21 𝑎22 … 𝑎2𝑛
⋮  ⋮  ⋱  ⋮
𝑎𝑚1 𝑎𝑚2 … 𝑎𝑚𝑛
), 𝑥′ = (
𝑥1
𝑥2
⋮
𝑥𝑛
), and 𝑏′ = (
𝑏1
𝑏2
⋮
𝑏𝑚
). (7) 
Obviously, 𝐴′ is a non-square matrix when 𝑛 > 𝑚; hence the determinant of 𝐴′ 
never exists. According to Theorem 1, if the matrix of coefficients 𝐴′ is not a non-
singular, then the adversary 𝒜 cannot obtain the unique solution.    ■ 
 
7.2 Input’s privacy 
In the deep neural networks, the weights and biases are in a fixed size (kernel size), 
are all calculated together with the input data with the same size of the kernel, by a 
linear transform that defined in Equation (1). Thus, the computation result of this area 
will compress into a point (or a value) of the next layer. 
According to the number of the kernels in a layer, the input data in the same area 
may repeatedly compute by different kernels to generate many different output values. 
Consequently, a set of linear equations can easily be constructed for the same input data 
as follows: 
𝑤11𝑥1 + 𝑤12𝑥2 + ⋯ + 𝑤1𝑛𝑥𝑛 + 𝑏1 ∙ 1 = 𝑦1 (8) 
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𝑤21𝑥1 + 𝑤22𝑥2 + ⋯ + 𝑤2𝑛𝑥𝑛 + 𝑏2 ∙ 1 = 𝑦2 
⋮ 
𝑤𝑚1𝑥1 + 𝑤𝑚2𝑥2 + ⋯ + 𝑤𝑚𝑛𝑥𝑛 + 𝑏𝑚 ∙ 1 = 𝑦𝑚 
, where 𝑥 is an input data (with 𝑛 size), and 𝑤 and 𝑏 are the weights and the biases 
in 𝑚 sets of the kernel, respectively. 
Now, assume that a model provider 𝒜, who also plays the role of an adversary, 
tries to recover the input data 𝑥 = {𝑥1, 𝑥2, … , 𝑥𝑛}  by receiving results 𝑦 =
{𝑦1, 𝑦2, … , 𝑦𝑚}  and all of the kernel (the model provider has all of the kernel). 
According to Definition 1, 𝒜 cannot obtain the unique 𝑥 when the number of the 
equation sets 𝑚 is less than the number of the unknowns 𝑛. Hence, the separating 
phase of the proposed scheme is secure, if 𝑛 > 𝑚. 
However, when we target at a fixed input data, we need to consider the leakage 
issue caused by shifting the kernel: the number of equations may increase because the 
DNN algorithm makes the kernel shifts with an amount step until it covers the whole 
input data. For this reason, when a kernel is overlapped into any pixel of the target 
image, each stride for the kernel will give the adversary 𝒜  more equations (the 
number of leakage equations is equal to total kernels number per shift). Figure 4 shows 
that the relationship between a target data and an overlapping kernel on the equation 
leakage issue. 
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Fig. 4. Example for the equation leakage. 
 
Although the overlap moving may leak more equations, it also generates more 
unknowns because it covers more input data. Then, we summarize the maximum 
number of the leakage equations 𝑀 and the total unknowns 𝑁, in the worst case, by 
the following equations: 
𝑀 = (⌈
2𝑛
𝑠
− 1⌉)2 × 𝑘 
𝑁 = ((𝑛 − 𝑠) + (⌈
2𝑛
𝑠
− 1⌉ × 𝑠)) × 𝑙 
(9) 
, where 𝑛 denotes the length (or the height) of the kernel, 𝑙 denotes the width of the 
kernel, 𝑘 denotes the number of the kernel, and 𝑠 denotes the stride size. 
 
7.3 Suggestions 
Therefore, when separating a model, the model provider needs to use Equation (9) 
to check 𝑀 and 𝑁 carefully such that 𝑁 > 𝑁 . Take the first layer of AlexNet for 
example, 𝑁 equals to 2187 and 𝑀 equals to 2400. In this case, the adversary 𝒜 
can eliminate 2400 equations to 2187 equations, in order to obtain the 2187 ×
2187 square matrix. Therefore, 𝒜 has a non-negligible of probability to get the 
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unique solution by Theorem 1. 
Fortunately is, the equation leakage issue can be solved easily by adjusting the 
kernel number. As shown in Equations (10), when the model provider changes the 
number of the original kernel 96 to 64, then 𝑁 and 𝑀 become 2187 and 1600, 
respectively. Hence, due to 𝑁 > 𝑀, it becomes secure again. 
𝑁 > 𝑀 
⇒ ((𝑛 − 𝑠) + (⌈
2𝑛
𝑠
− 1⌉ × 𝑠)) × 𝑙 > (⌈
2𝑛
𝑠
− 1⌉)2 × 𝑘 
⇒
((𝑛 − 𝑠) + (⌈
2𝑛
𝑠 − 1⌉ × 𝑠)) × 𝑙
(⌈
2𝑛
𝑠 − 1⌉)
2
> 𝑘 
(10) 
 
7.4 Output’s privacy 
Once the input privacy is protected, the privacy of the output can be easily achieved. 
The reason is that our well-trained model can complement its output by a complement 
signal from the data owner. As long as the model provider cannot obtain the 
complement signal from the received result, she or he cannot know the predicted result 
is complemented or not. Then, the model provider obtains the correct output answer 
only has a 50% chance. Obviously, it equals to the randomly guessing. Hence, our 
proposed scheme can protect the privacy of the output. 
 
7.5 Model’s privacy 
The partitioning phase of the proposed scheme can protect the privacy of the model. 
In this phase, the model provider only publishes a little part of the parameters in the 
model to the data owner. It is impossible that the data owner reconstructs the whole 
model without the rest of the parameters. Moreover, the data owner also does not know 
the topology (neural network’s structure) of the model, which also increases the 
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difficulty of reconstruction. Hence, our proposed scheme can protect the privacy of the 
entire model. 
 
8 Experimental results 
8.1 Experimental setting 
In this section, we evaluate the performance and accuracy of our proposed scheme. 
The experiments were conducted on a machine with an Intel i5-8400 CPU, 32GM RAM, 
the Ubuntu 16.04 LTS operating system, and a Geforce GTX 1070Ti GPU with 8GB 
GDDR5. We separately implemented two schemes in Python 3.5 with Tensorflow: 1) 
The D&C model and 2) the secure model. The D&C model can identify a dog or a cat 
from an input image. We use this model for simulating a non-secure model. After that, 
we then apply our proposed scheme to transform the non-secure model to our secure 
model. Simultaneously, we also test the different preserving layer 𝑁 for the model 
accuracy and the corresponding training time. The AlexNet is the basic DNN model in 
our experimental, and Dogs vs. Cats [7] and MNIST [8] are two datasets used to train 
it. The configuration of the AlexNet, Dogs vs. Cats, and MNIST are shown in Table 1. 
For a fair comparison, the configurations of all of the models in this section are under 
the same setting. 
 
Table1. The configurations on DNN and datasets of the proposed scheme. 
DNN and datasets Configurations 
AlexNet_v2  5 convolution layers + 3 fully connect layers 
 Conv1: kernel size : 11 × 11 × 3 × 64, stide: 4 
 Conv2: kernel size : 5 × 5 × 64 × 192, stide: 1 
 Conv3: kernel size : 3 × 3 × 192 × 384, stide: 1 
 Conv4: kernel size : 3 × 3 × 384 × 384, stide: 1 
 Conv5: kernel size : 3 × 3 × 384 × 256, stide: 1 
 FC6: size: 1024 
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 FC7: size: 1024 
 FC8: size: 2 classes 
 Batch size = 16 
 Dropout =0.5 
 Learning rate = 0.001 
 Power = 0.9 
 Momentum = 0.9 
Dogs vs. Cats  10000 dog images + 10000 cat images for training 
 2500 dog images + 2500 cat images for validation 
MNIST  12665 zero/one images for training and validation 
 
In the first D&C model, we use the Dogs vs. Cats to train the AlexNet, which is 
used to pretend the old non-secure model that is to classify the images of dog and cat 
only. The second model is our secure model, which extends the complement signal to 
the D&C model. Here, we adopt 0 and 1’s images from the MNIST to replace the 
complement signals 0 and 1 in our secure model. The training method is that we first 
randomly choose one image (with the size 244 × 244 × 3) from Dogs vs. Cats and the 
other image (with the size 28 × 28 × 1) from MNIST. Then, we input both images into 
the model according to our proposed scheme. Here, the dog/cat image should work 
(together with weights and biases) as usual and the 0/1 image should wait until the 
concatenating layer. When two images are ready to concatenate with each other, we 
first resize the 0/1 image according to the size of the output from the dog/cat image and 
directly concatenate both images as a new input for the next layer. Therefore, the new 
input that contains original data and the complement signal can easily enter the next 
layer again then continues its training. 
 
8.2 Training time and accuracy 
In order to simulate the training time of our secure model, we have to train the 
D&C model as a base model. Then, we preserve the different layer number of the D&C 
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model to test the training time of our secure model. Table 2 shows the result of the 
training time. As we retain more layers to practice our secure model, we observe that 
the completed time begins to decline in the same training steps. In contrast, if we train 
the secure model without using any layer of the non-secure model (it also means that 
we directly train the secure model), the training needs more time to finish its job. 
 
Table 2. Comparisons of Training Time (in seconds) 
Training 
steps 
The D&C 
model 
The secure 
model 
(𝑁 = 0) 
The secure 
model 
(𝑁 = 1) 
The secure 
model 
(𝑁 = 2) 
The secure 
model 
(𝑁 = 3) 
The secure 
model 
(𝑁 = 4) 
5,000 172 264 143 136 136 126 
10,000 323 391 284 270 270 250 
20,000 650 694 568 564 541 499 
40,000 1261 1304 1130 1127 1073 998 
60,000 1965 1919 1699 1618 1614 1497 
80,000 2531 2519 2264 2150 2146 1997 
100,000 3173 3137 2830 2688 2690 2493 
200,000 6280 6203 5649 5379 5355 4970 
 
Second, we tested the accuracy of our secure model. Similarly, we preserve the 
different layer number of the D&C model in our training and compare each result with 
the D&C model. To calculate the accuracy rate, we randomly pick 100 images from the 
validation set and check the number of the correct/wrong answer. Then, we repeat 1000 
times and calculate the average accuracy. Our average accuracy (AA) is defined as 
follows: 
AA =
∑ (
𝑐𝑖
𝑐𝑖 + 𝑖𝑐𝑖
)1000𝑖=0
1000
 
(11) 
, where 𝑐 represents the number of the correct predicted answers and 𝑖𝑐 represents 
the number of the wrong (incorrect) predicted answers. Table 3 shows the experimental 
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result of the average accuracy. Here, we can observe that it does not work well at the 
case of 𝑁 equal to zero if we do not have enough training steps. However, when we 
start to preserve the layers of the D&C model for training our model, the average 
accuracy becomes very close to the D&C model. 
 
Table 3. Comparisons of Average Accuracy 
Training 
steps 
The D&C 
model 
The secure 
model 
(𝑁 = 0) 
The secure 
model 
(𝑁 = 1) 
The secure 
model 
(𝑁 = 2) 
The secure 
model 
(𝑁 = 3) 
The secure 
model 
(𝑁 = 4) 
5,000 0.88054 0.67094 0.81058 0.83932 0.8734 0.87805 
10,000 0.94051 0.80123 0.88359 0.91631 0.93036 0.93062 
20,000 0.9771 0.86277 0.92085 0.93351 0.94859 0.95807 
40,000 0.9816 0.88192 0.92815 0.94402 0.95832 0.96605 
60,000 0.98213 0.89313 0.93074 0.94641 0.96176 0.96807 
80,000 0.98059 0.89345 0.93863 0.9458 0.95789 0.97242 
100,000 0.98356 0.89908 0.93516 0.94244 0.96082 0.97119 
200,000 0.98224 0.90333 0.93343 0.9452 0.95766 0.97353 
 
For an in-depth exploration of the training time, we focus on the convergence rate 
and compare our secure model with the D&C model. As shown in Figure 5, the 
convergence rates of our secure model, in different training steps, is still better than the 
D&C model. Moreover, we also evaluate the convergence rate of our secure model in 
four different preserving cases as shown in Figure 6, such as preserving the kernel 
values of (a) the first layer (𝑁 = 1), (b) the first two layers (𝑁 = 2), (c) the first three 
layers (𝑁 = 3), and (d) the first four layers (𝑁 = 4). Even though the performance in 
Fig. 6(a) is not as good as the original one, the convergence rate becomes fast when we 
start to preserve the first two, three, and four layers. The results have shown that our 
conversion method not only works (assists the original model in transmuting) but also 
fast with good accuracy. 
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(a) 5,000 
 
(b) 10,000 
 
(c) 20,000 
 
(d) 40,000 
 
(e) 60,000 
 
(f) 80,000 
 
(g) 100,000 
 
(h) 200,000 
Figure 5. Convergence time of different training steps of the original mode (D&C 
model) and our secure model (𝑁 = 3). 
 
 
Figure 6. Convergence times for different preserving layers of the secure model. 
 
8.3 Storage and communication costs 
In order to evaluate the overhead of a data owner who performs our secure scheme, 
we first simulate the additional storage space that a data owner needed in different 
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partitioning layer of the secure model. Due to the parameters (weights and biases) are 
all presented in floating point, we adopt the standard of IEEE 754 that double-precision 
floating-point format. More precisely, we use 64 bits for presenting one floating point 
number. Hence, we can easily summarize the total parameters (kernel size) needed in 
different partitioning layer of the secure model and multiplied by 64 bits per parameter 
to obtain the total storage cost. Table 4 shows the storage space requirement. 
 
Table 4. The requirement of the storage space. 
The secure model Number of parameters Storage space requirements 
𝑁 = 1 23,296 ≈ 182 kB 
𝑁 = 2 21,164,032 ≈ 2.52 mB 
𝑁 = 3 63,655,936 ≈ 7.59 mB 
𝑁 = 4 148,615,168 ≈ 17.72 mB 
kB: kilobyte; mB: megabyte 
Then, we evaluate the communication time in an environment of 1Mb per second 
upload/download speed. In this case, we estimate one link in the output is presenting in 
8 bits (according to the feature map image, 8 bits per pixel). Hence, we can use the total 
links multiplied by 8 bits and then divided by the transmission bandwidth to evaluate 
the communication times for each partitioning layer of the secure model. The estimated 
communication times are shown in Table 5. 
 
Table 5. The estimated communication times 
The secure model Number of links Communication time requirements 
(millisecond) 
𝑁 = 1 193,600 ≈ 184.631 ms 
𝑁 = 2 186,624 ≈ 177.979 ms 
𝑁 = 3 519,168 ≈ 61.89 ms 
𝑁 = 4 519,168 ≈ 61.89 ms 
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9 Conclusions 
In this paper, we presented a privacy-preserving deep learning model and a secure 
training/inference scheme without using any cryptography-component, which can 
protect the privacy of the input, the output and the model in the application of the neural 
network, and also support the transformation from a non-secure model into a secure 
model. The security analysis has shown that our proposed scheme is secure. Our 
experimental results have also shown that our proposed scheme is very effective in 
training time, accuracy, and storage requirements. Hence, the proposed scheme is 
secure and suitable for the real applications. 
This research opens a new frontier for us to further explore the proposed scheme. 
Future work includes further improving the inference accuracy, applying to various 
neural networks, developing various partitioning methods to reduce the communication 
cost, and developing an effective training mechanism using the proposed scheme. 
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